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APPLICATION NO.	F	ILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/976,607	09/976,607 10/12/2001		Michael B. Elliott	33836000013	3270
30498	7590	02/13/2006		EXAMINER	
ACCENTU	JRE		CAMPEN, KELLY SCAGGS		
C/O VEDDI	ER PRICE	KAUFMAN & KA	MMHOLZ, P.C.		
222 NORTH LASALLE STREET				ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
CHICAGO, IL 60601				3624	

3624

DATE MAILED: 02/13/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)					
	09/976,607	ELLIOTT ET AL.					
Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit					
	Kelly Campen	3624					
The MAILING DATE of this communication app Period for Reply	pears on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence address					
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPL' WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING D.  - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.1 after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.  - If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period of Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	ATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION 36(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timwill apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from a cause the application to become ABANDONE	l.  lely filed  the mailing date of this communication.  O (35 U.S.C. § 133).					
Status							
1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 13 Ju	ine 2005						
	action is non-final.						
<i>'</i> = <i>'</i> -	<i>,</i> —						
closed in accordance with the practice under Ex parte Quayle, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.							
Disposition of Claims	,						
4)⊠ Claim(s) <u>1-4,6-8,10,11 and 13-21</u> is/are pending in the application.							
4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdrawn from consideration.							
5) Claim(s) is/are allowed.							
6)  Claim(s) <u>1-4,6-8,10,11 and 13-21</u> is/are rejected.							
7) Claim(s) is/are objected to.	7) Claim(s) is/are objected to.						
8) Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/o	r election requirement.						
Application Papers							
9) The specification is objected to by the Examine	er.						
10) The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) acc	epted or b) $\square$ objected to by the E	Examiner.					
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).							
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).							
11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Ex	caminer. Note the attached Office	Action or form PTO-152.					
Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119							
12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f). a) All b) Some * c) None of:							
	<ol> <li>Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.</li> </ol>						
2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No							
3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage							
application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).							
* See the attached detailed Office action for a list	or the certified copies not receive	<b>0</b> .					
Attachment(s)							
1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)	4) Interview Summary	(PTO-413)					
2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)	Paper No(s)/Mail Da	te					
<ol> <li>Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)</li> <li>Paper No(s)/Mail Date 3/8/05 (3/22/5 fxd.</li> </ol>	6) Other:	atent Application (PTO-152)					

### **DETAILED ACTION**

Claims 1-4, 6-8, 10-11, 13-21 are currently pending, claims 5, 9, and 12 have been canceled in amendment dated 6/13/05.

## Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

2. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

3. Claims 2, 6, 9, 10-11, 14, 16, 20-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regard as the invention.

The following recitations are vague and indefinite, not only because it is not clear what are the meets and bounds, but also because the recitations are relative in nature:

"value the ability"

"concerned"

"aggressive"

"tactics"

"allocation of available collection resources"

### Claim Objections

Claim 13 is objected to because of the following informalities: it depends improperly from canceled claim 12. Appropriate correction is required.

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# Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

5. Claims 1-4, 6-8, 10-11, 13-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as non-statutory. The method claims as presented do not claim a technological basis in the body of the claim. Without a claimed basis, the claim may be interpreted in an alternative as involving no more than a manipulation of an abstract idea and therefore non-statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101. In contrast, a method claim that includes in the preamble and body of the claim at least one structural / functional interrelationship which can only be computer implemented (and non-trivial) is considered to have a technological basis [See Ex parte Bowman, 61 USPQ2d 1669, 1671 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 2001) – used only for content and reasoning since not precedential].

There is no technological basis in the preamble of the independent claims.

# Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

- 6. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
  - (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

7. Claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13-15, 18-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Szlam et al in view of White et al.

Szlam et al disclose improving or enhancing debt collection from a plurality of debtors including attitudinally classifying a debtor (and debtor likelihoods) into at least one of a plurality of attitudinal elements according to a plurality of attitudinal profiles (col 21, lines 1-10) each of said elements suggesting a debt collection strategy which is then assigned (via a relative value) and employed (col 22, lines 50-67; col 23, lines 1-10). A collection agent is determined having a skill set conforming to a debtors attitudinal profile and likelihood to make payment on debt (col 22, lines 61-65). Identifying debtors sharing a set of values and preferences for how they wish to be treated is disclosed (col 21, lines 1-10). Optimal allocation of available collection resources is disclosed (col 7, lines 45-65, written correspondence sent (col 22, lines 39-49). The use of a "forceful voice (col 23, lines 1) encompasses "aggressive" collection tactics.

Szlam et al do not describe their attitudinal elements as "segments " or use of the term "modeling".

White et al disclose use of segments (para 0022) and modeling (para 0023, 0024, 0040).

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include segments because White et al teaches segmentations as useful in the debt collection process (para 0022).

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include modeling because White et al teaches modeling typical of computer processing of debt collection strategy (para 0040).

8. Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Szlam et al in view of White et al as applied to claims 1 above, and further in view of Hamscher.

Szlam et al specifically discloses the use of scripts in the prior art (col 1, line 29-32).

Szlam et al in view of White et al do not specifically describe their scripts as "negotiation scripts". While it is the examiner's position that such is inherent to the prior art, the reference to Hamscher specifically discloses such (para 0058).

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include negotiation scripts since Hamscher discloses complexity in a business negotiation that requires scripting (para 0002, 0058).

9. Claims 2, 7, 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Szlam et al in view of White et al as applied to claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10-11, 13-15, 17-21 above, and further in view of Makuch et al.

Claims 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Szlam et al in view of White et al in further view of as applied 1 above, and further in view of Hamscher in view of Makuch et al.

Hamscher is applied as describe in the above rejection utilizing the reference.

Szlam et al, White et al, and Hamscher do not specifically disclose segments that include debtors who value the ability to restructure debt payment or debtors who are concerned about credit rating.

Matuch et al disclose concern of debtors regarding credit rating and value to continue as a customer of debt payments restructure debt (page 102: col 1, para 2; col 2, para 1)

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include segments that include debtors who value the ability to restructure debt payment or debtors who are concerned about credit rating because Matuch et al teaches further attitudinal classifications than are taught by Szlam et al.

# **Double Patenting**

10. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970);and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

11. Claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10, 15, 18-21 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-2, 5-7 of copending Application No. 10/011523 in view of Szlam et al.

What is not claimed in the copending application is the use of attitudinal segments.

Szlam et al disclose attitudinal segments/classification.

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include in the claims pending such since Szlam teaches sensitivity profiles as enhancing debt collection (col 20, lines 43-44).

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection.

12. Claims 1, 3-4, 6-8, 10, 15, 18-21 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-11 of copending Application No. 10/2002262 in view of Szlam et al.

What is not claimed in the copending application is the use of attitudinal segments.

Szlam et al disclose attitudinal segments/classification.

It would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to include in the claims pending such since Szlam teaches sensitivity profiles as enhancing debt collection (col 20, lines 43-44).

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection.

### Response to Arguments

Regarding the 35 U.S.C 101 rejection, the following further explanation is given:

As an initial matter, the United States Constitution under Art. I, §8, cl. 8 gave

Congress the power to "[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing

for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings

and discoveries". In carrying out this power, Congress authorized under 35 U.S.C.

§101 a grant of a patent to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,

machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, or any new and useful improvement

thereof." Therefore, a fundamental premise is that a patent is a statutorily created

vehicle for Congress to confer an exclusive right to the inventors for "inventions" that

promote the progress of "science and the useful arts". The phrase "technological arts"

has been created and used by the courts to offer another view of the term "useful arts". See *In re Musgrave*, 167 USPQ (BNA) 280 (CCPA 1970). Hence, the first test of whether an invention is eligible for a patent is to determine if the invention is within the "technological arts".

Further, despite the express language of §101, several judicially created exceptions have been established to exclude certain subject matter as being patentable subject matter covered by §101. These exceptions include "laws of nature", "natural phenomena", and "abstract ideas". See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450, U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ (BNA) 1, 7 (1981). However, courts have found that even if an invention incorporates abstract ideas, such as mathematical algorithms, the invention may nevertheless be statutory subject matter if the invention as a whole produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." See *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* 149 F.3d 1368, 1973, 47 USPQ2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

This "two prong" test was evident when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decided an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See *In re Toma*, 197 USPQ (BNA) 852 (CCPA 1978). In *Toma*, the court held that the recited mathematical algorithm did not render the claim as a whole non-statutory using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as applied to *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ (BNA) 673 (1972). Additionally, the court decided separately on the issue of the "technological arts". The court developed a "technological arts" analysis:

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The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter purports to replace...is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g., whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine. *In re Toma* at 857.

In *Toma*, the claimed invention was a computer program for translating a source human language (e.g., Russian) into a target human language (e.g., English). The court found that the claimed computer implemented process was within the "technological art" because the claimed invention was an operation being performed by a computer within a computer.

The decision in *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.*never addressed this prong of the test. In *State Street Bank & Trust Co.*, the court found that the "mathematical exception" using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, application to determining the presence of statutory subject matter but rather, statutory subject matter should be based on whether the operation produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result". See *State Street Bank & Trust Co.* at 1374. Furthermore,

, the court found that there was no "business method exception" since the court decisions that purported to create such exceptions were based on novelty or lack of enablement issues and not on statutory grounds. Therefore, the court held that "[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under §101, but rather under §§102, 103 and 112." See State Street Bank & Trust Co. at 1377. Both of these analysis goes towards whether the claimed invention is non-statutory because of the presence of an abstract idea. Indeed, State Street abolished the Freeman-Walter-Abele test used in *Toma*. However, State Street never addressed the second part of the analysis, i.e., the "technological arts" test established in *Toma* because the invention in State Street (i.e., a computerized system for determining the year-end income, expense, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio) was already determined to be within the technological arts under the *Toma* test. This dichotomy has been recently acknowledged by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) in affirming a §101 rejection finding the claimed invention to be non-statutory. [See Ex parte Bowman, 61 USPQ2d (BNA) 1669 (BdPatApp&Int 2001) - used only for content and reasoning since not precedential].

Applicant's arguments filed 6/13/05 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 208

USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); *In re Merck & Co.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

With regards to applicants argument that he Szlam reference does not teach or suggest any type of method for improving debt collection from a plurality of debtors nor any attitudinal classifying of debtors into attitudinal segments according to attitudinal profiles where the segments suggest a debt collection strategy to employ with respect to the debtor as no debt collection strategies of any kind are taught in the Szlam reference, Examiner disagrees and refers applicant to the rejection above for specific citations and reasoning.

### Conclusion

14. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Kelly Campen whose telephone number is (571) 272-6740. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Thursday.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Vincent Millin can be reached on (571) 272-6747. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.

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**KSC** 

HANI M. KAZIMI PRIMARY EXAMINER